Third, given Reynolds’ frequent insistence on a continuity between epistemology and the social sciences, it is odd that Bernard Williams’ Truth and Truthfulness (2002) is only briefly mentioned in a four-line footnote. Williams offers a genealogy of the social institution of testimony, focused centrally on the question how we can bring testifiers to develop the epistemic virtues of “accuracy” and “sincerity”. Williams emphasises that the institution of testimony is a collective good. Individuals who are rational in a purely self-interested way will try to “free-ride”: they will seek to obtain accurate and sincere testimony from others without offering anything in return. After all, collecting useful information usually involves costly “investigative investments” (2002: 88). How is the problem of collective action solved? The core of Williams’ answer is that accuracy and sincerity (and with them the institution itself) must come to be regarded by community members as shared intrinsic — rather than as merely instrumental — values (2002: 90). And to achieve this goal, Williams says, people must be “discouraged or encouraged, sanctioned, shamed, or rewarded”. In other words, the structure “of mutual respect and the capacity for shame in the face of oneself and others, is a traditional, indeed archaic, ethical resource, but it is still very necessary” (2002: 44, 121). All this seems to me far too close to Reynolds’ position for him to set it aside. Moreover, Williams is arguably one step ahead of Reynolds: Williams recognizes that a focus on social norms must involve bringing social institutions and collective goods into the analysis.